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bstract: Promoting youth representation in parliaments is 
a growing global priority. To promote youth leadership and 
more inclusive politics, youth organizations in Nigeria mo-
bilized successfully for a constitutional reform to lower the eligibility 
age to run for political office. In this paper, we draw on global data 
to assess whether lower eligibility ages will in fact lead to higher levels 
of youth participation. We find that lower age requirements positively 
affect the representation of the youngest and next youngest cohorts in 
parliament. We draw on qualitative interviews and gender literature 
to theorize that lower age limits have immediate and longer-term 
“mobilizing effects”, shifting the calculations of potential candidates 
in terms of the age at which they first decide to run for office.
Keywords: Youth, Young people, Politics, Parliament, Nigeria
Introduction
Enhancing opportunities for young people to participate in politics 
has become a growing global priority, with organizations like the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the United Nations (UN) 
seeking to collect data and develop strategies to elect a larger share 
of young people to national parliaments. One recommendation 
put forward by the IPU (2016: 16) is to align the ages at which 
citizens may vote in elections and run for political office. In line 
with this logic, a movement of young people in Nigeria launched 
a campaign in 2016 to reduce the age limit to stand as political 
candidates. Conceived by YIAGA Africa, a youth-based civil soci-
ety organization seeking to promote good governance and youth 
political participation, the campaign soon encompassed more than 
100 youth organizations and became known by its hashtag #Not-
TooYoungToRun. Inspired by this example, in late 2016 the UN 
Youth Envoy launched a global Not Too Young to Run campaign 
in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme, 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
IPU, YIAGA, and the European Youth Forum.1
The #NotTooYoungToRun bill in Nigeria aimed to amend sections 
65, 106, 131 and 177 of the Nigerian constitution to reduce the 
eligibility age for the Houses of Assembly and House of Represent-
atives from 30 to 25 years old, the Senate and Governorship from 
35 to 30 years old, and the office of the President from 40 to 35 
years old.2 Sponsored by allies in the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, the bill passed both houses of parliament in July 2017. 
The proposed amendment was then presented to the 36 Houses of 
Assembly of the Nigerian states, 33 of which approved the bill (far 
exceeding the 24 states required for passage). In April 2018, the 
Senate sent the bill to the President for approval, who signed it – 
after further lobbying by youth organizations – into law on 31 May 
2018. The final version reduced the age to run for President, the 
House of Representatives, and the state Houses of Assembly, but 
retained the existing age qualifications for Governors and Senators.
After the bill’s passage, the #NotTooYoungToRun campaign 
convened a press conference and declared that it marked “the be-
ginning of a new era” in Nigerian politics. They argued that the 
reform would promote democratic development, deepen inter-
generational dialogue and learning, reduce political violence and 
instability, and enhance competitive politics. They also empha-
sized the positive impact on the political rights of young people, 
pointing out that youth under the age of 35 formed 65% of the 
population and 53% of registered voters. They thanked all the 
elected officials who voted in favour of the bill, thereby demon-
strating “unparalleled belief in youth leadership and inclusive pol-
itics” and “putting Nigeria on the global map as a country fully 
invested in meeting the needs of its youth”. They urged the “po-
litical class” – “if you want the youth vote” – to take active steps 
within their political parties to support the emergence of more 
young candidates (NotTooYoungToRun 2018a: 3).
Despite these arguments, it is not clear whether lower eligibility 
ages will necessarily lead to higher levels of youth representation. 
On the one hand, reforms may stimulate latent political ambi-
tion among youth, leading them to begin preparing political 
campaigns at earlier ages than they might have done prior to the 
legislative change. On the other hand, the new rules are permis-
sive, not prescriptive: they allow younger people to come forward 
as aspirants for political office, but do not require political parties 
to actually nominate greater numbers of young people as political 
candidates. Given that young people around the world tend to 
eschew formal means of political participation, like voting and 
running for office, enacting such reforms may in fact have no 
effect on their political ambitions.
In this article, we explore these questions using quantitative and 
qualitative data and develop an original theory of “mobilizing 
 effects” to explain how and why age eligibility reforms will, by and 
large increase levels of youth representation worldwide. Given the 
recent passage of the #NotTooYoungToRun bill, which will not 
apply until the next elections, we turn to global data to predict 
what may occur in terms of future youth representation in Nige-
ria. We begin in the first section by providing an overview of age 
eligibility requirements globally, finding that the vast majority of 
countries impose a “waiting time” – although this gap varies sub-
stantially across countries – between the voting age and the age 
required to run to become a member of parliament (MP). In the 
second section, we map justifications for imposing such a gap – as 
well as the considerations behind decisions to reduce it recently in 
a number of countries.
A
They argued that the reform would promote democratic 
development, deepen intergenerational dialogue and 
learning, reduce political violence and instability, and 
enhance competitive politics.
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In the third section, we present descriptive statistics on youth 
representation worldwide and then perform a series of statistical 
analyses to determine the relationship between age eligibility re-
quirements and the share of young parliamentarians. Our analy-
sis reveals both “immediate” and “downstream” (longer-term) 
effects: lower age requirements positively affect the representation 
of the youngest cohort in parliament – but also, and even more 
strongly, positively influence the share of MPs in the next young-
est cohort. This correlation holds even when controlling for other 
factors that might shape the proportion of young MPs, like the 
electoral system, age of the population, level of democracy, and 
how active young people are in civic and political life.
In the fourth section, we unpack these statistical relationships 
drawing on interviews with young MPs and activists,3 articles on 
the NotTooYoungToRun website, and the broadly scholarly lit-
erature on women and youth in politics. Based on these insights, 
we theorize that younger age limits have “mobilizing effects”, 
shifting the calculations of potential candidates in terms of the 
age at which they first decide to run for office. With a lower eli-
gibility requirement, citizens can stand as candidates at a younger 
age. This opens up opportunities to run for higher offices, like 
parliament (an immediate effect). It can also increase the share 
of young people contesting lower-level offices, like local coun-
cil seats, which lay the groundwork for contesting parliamentary 
elections in the future (a downstream effect). We conclude that 
rule changes can play a crucial role in signalling greater openness 
to youth participation, spurring their greater engagement and in-
clusion in the political system.
Age eligibility requirements in global perspective
To map out what age eligibility requirements look like worldwide, 
we constructed a dataset in partnership with the IPU, combining 
information from surveys completed by parliamentary informa-
tion offices sent to the IPU in late 2017 with data that we coded 
from parliamentary websites in early 2018. Our dataset covers 
192 single, lower, and upper houses of parliament in 144 coun-
tries (for the full list, see Inter-Parliamentary Union forthcom-
ing). We have full data on voter and candidate eligibility ages for 
169 chambers.
Figure 1 illustrates the share of parliamentary houses with  candidate 
eligibility ages falling within four different age ranges. Approxi-
mately one-quarter of countries permit citizens to run for office at 
age 18 (or younger). More than half stipulate a  minimum eligibil-
ity age of 20 to 25. Nearly 20% require citizens to be between 26 
and 35 years old, and 4% establish a minimum age of 36 or older. 
Despite the recent reforms, Nigerian youth will still have to wait 
longer than many of their peers around the world before they will 
be eligible to run, between the ages of 25 and 35.
Table 1 compares the average and range of age requirements to vote 
and to run for office. Most countries establish a minimum voting 
age of 18. Countries that stipulate a voting age as low as 16 years 
old include Argentina, Austria, Brazil and Ecuador. In contrast, 
citizens in the United Arab Emirates must wait until they are 25. 
Requirements are far more varied in relation to candidate eligibility, 
ranging from 17 in Timor-Leste’s unicameral parliament to age 40 
in the upper chambers of Algeria, Cambodia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Gabon and Paraguay. Juxtaposing these requirements, citizens 
must wait – on average – more than five years after becoming a 
voter before they can run for office themselves. The lack of overlap 
can be seen even more clearly in Figure 2, showing the number of 
chambers corresponding to voting and eligibility age requirements.
In addition to these broad patterns, it is important to note dif-
ferences between lower or single chambers versus upper houses 
of parliament. The average age required to run as a candidate for 
lower or unicameral chambers is 22 (ranging from 17 to 35), 
while for upper houses it is 29 (ranging from 18 to 45). On aver-
age, citizens must wait just under four years to become eligible to 
run for lower or unicameral chambers and nearly eleven years to 
run for election to upper houses.
Citizens must wait – on average – more than five years 
after becoming a voter before they can run for office 
themselves.
We theorize that younger age limits have “mobilizing 
effects,” shifting the calculations of potential candidates 
in terms of the age at which they first decide to run for 
office.
Figure 1: Minimum age eligibility requirements
Figure 2: Voter-eligibility age gaps in global perspective
Table 1: Age requirements to vote and to run for office, compared
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Age eligibility debates
The contrasting age requirements for these two basic political 
rights are puzzling. Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights from 1966 states that “Every citizen 
shall have the right and opportunity, without any of the restric-
tions mentioned in article 2 [distinctions based on race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, property, birth, or other status] and without unreason-
able restrictions… [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.”
In 1996, the UN Human Rights Committee made several clarifi-
cations regarding this Article via General Comment No. 25. Para-
graph 4 reads: “Any conditions which apply to the exercise of the 
rights protected by Article 25 should be based on objective and 
reasonable criteria. For example, it may be reasonable to require a 
higher age for election or appointment to particular offices than 
for exercising the right to vote, which should be available to every 
adult citizen.”
The Human Rights Council does not specify in the document 
why it would be “objective and reasonable” to impose a higher age 
for candidacy versus voting. However, interviews and scholarly 
research provide some insights into the mentality behind this ap-
proach. Young people, for example, are often told by middle-aged 
politicians that their “turn in politics has yet to come” (Trantidis 
2016: 154). During the debate in Nigeria, Itse Sagay, Chairman of 
the Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption, said in 
an interview that a young person is not fit to be President of Nige-
ria, stressing the importance of climbing gradually up the ladder of 
success (Olaniyan 2018: 1). Along similar lines, political scientists 
most commonly use “political experience” as a measure for judging 
the “quality” of elected officials (Weeks and Baldez 2015: 122).
Yet, as many young politicians and activists are fond of saying, 
“youth are not the leaders of tomorrow…they are the leaders of 
today” (Inter-Parliamentary Union forthcoming). Moreover, as 
Samson Itodo, the YIAGA Executive Director, has argued, age 
does not determine competence. Indeed, qualities needed to suc-
ceed as a leader include having the opportunity to lead, oppor-
tunities to expand one’s skills, and a commitment to self-growth 
(Uzor 2018: 2). Disqualifying youth on the grounds of being 
young, furthermore, begs the question of how exactly to gain the 
much needed “experience” to advance.
The global Not Too Young To Run campaign thus seeks to flip 
the traditional script with the tagline: “We believe that if you’re 
old enough to vote, you’re old enough to run for office.” Partner 
organizations support the alignment of the voting and candida-
cy eligibility ages on the grounds that “young people deserve the 
same rights to run for office and age discrimination is a hindrance 
to full participation and democracy.” 4 The campaign notes that 
people under the age of 30 form more than half of the world’s 
population, yet constitute less than 2% of all MPs. Indeed, ap-
proximately one-third of lower houses and more than 80% of up-
per houses have no young MPs under the age of 30.5
In addition to Nigeria, a reduction in the age of candidate eli-
gibility was undertaken in Algeria with the express purpose of 
stimulating youth representation (IPU 2016: 15). In early 2018, 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan was report-
edly considering reducing the eligibility age for all public offices 
to 20, following a 2015 reform lowering the voting age from 20 
to 18. Supporters argue that lowering the candidacy eligibility age 
may earn the party greater support among younger voters, as well 
as spark greater interest in politics among youth. The proposal is 
endorsed by several opposition parties but also opposed by some 
more senior members of the LDP.6
Despite their advocacy of the Age Reduction Bill in Nigeria, mem-
bers of the NotTooYoungToRun coalition also recognize that sim-
ply signing the bill into law is not a guarantee that youth representa-
tion will increase. In their press release in early June 2018, therefore, 
they called for parliamentarians and political parties to take addi-
tional steps to stimulate youth participation. These include devel-
oping affirmative action measures to require a certain percentage of 
young candidates on party ballots, enacting electoral reform bills 
limiting campaign expenditures, introducing democratic primaries 
within political parties, and ensuring credible and peaceful elections 
(NotTooYoungToRun 2018a: 4). Young politicians in other coun-
tries similarly view these types of reforms as necessary for overcom-
ing key barriers in access and resources faced by young candidates 
(Inter-Parliamentary Union forthcoming).
Youth representation in national parliaments
The dataset includes information on the age distribution of male 
and female MPs across nine age categories: 18-20, 21-30, 31-40, 
41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80, 81-90, and 91+. Figure 3 tabulates 
the global mean for six age groups, disaggregated by sex, and com-
pares the share of MPs to the percentage of the global population 
within each age category. More than one-third of parliamentarians 
worldwide are in their fifties, and more than one-half are aged 51 
and above. In contrast, MPs under the age of 40 constitute less than 
15% of the total. Across all age groups, men outnumber women, 
often by significant proportions, although there is greater gender 
balance within the younger age cohorts. The figure shows in strik-
ing terms, finally, that parliamentarians under the age of 40 (par-
ticularly in the 21-30 age cohort) are under-represented in compar-
ison to their share of the population, while MPs over the age of 40 
(especially in the 51-60 age group) are massively over-represented.
Although the political representation of young people is under- 
studied in comparison to the representation of women, ethnic 
minorities, and – to a lesser extent – the LGBT community and 
The Human Rights Council does not specify in the 
 document why it would be “objective and reasonable”  
to impose a higher age for candidacy versus voting.
Members of the NotTooYoungToRun coalition also 
recognize that simply signing the bill into law is not a 
guarantee that youth representation will increase.
Parliamentarians under the age of 40 (particularly in the 
21-30 age cohort) are under-represented in comparison 
to their share of the population, while MPs over the age 
of 40 (especially in the 51-60 age group) are massively 
over-represented.
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people with disabilities, the few surveys asking about the impor-
tance of representing different age groups in parliament find that 
“age” is identified as an important category of political representa-
tion. Lisi and Freire (2012: 373) find, for example, that parlia-
mentarians in Belgium, France and Portugal identify “age” and 
“gender” to be the most legitimate targets of affirmative action 
in candidate selection processes. Along similar lines, data from 
the Political Participation and Representation (PARTIREP) p roj- 
ect,7 which surveyed MPs across fourteen European countries, 
indicates that most consider it “fairly” or “very” important that a 
variety of ages be represented in parliament (see Figure 4).
Taken together, these various sources of data indicate that (1) young 
people are under-represented in parliaments around the world and 
that (2) political elites recognize a need to include younger cohorts 
to a greater extent. To bridge this gap, recent scholarly contributions 
explore the potential of youth quotas (Bidadanure 2014: 1; Trem-
mel et al. 2015: 1), as well as the role of party youth organizations 
(Bruter/Harrison 2009: 1; Hooghe et al. 2004: 193), to recruit and 
elect greater numbers of young people to political office. In com-
parison, age eligibility requirements largely remain under-theorized 
and under-studied in this literature.
Given varying definitions regarding the category of “youth”, we 
explore the impact of eligibility requirements using three age 
thresholds: the share of parliamentarians under 30, under 40, and 
under 45. We find a strong correlation between lower candidate 
eligibility ages and higher proportions of young MPs at all three 
age thresholds. Figure 5 shows the relationship for MPs under the 
age of 45, which is the definition of “young” adopted by the IPU 
Forum of Young Parliamentarians. The correlation is -.414 and is 
highly statistically significant: as the eligibility age increases, the 
share of young MPs decreases. This pattern remains true and sig-
nificant for the other two definitions of “young”, as well as when 
comparing age requirements and median MP age. It holds true 
too for both lower and upper chambers.
There are, of course, a number of factors, outside of age require-
ments, that might also be significant in predicting the percentage 
of young MPs. The electoral system is one such factor. We find 
that MPs under 45 constitute an average of 30.9% of MPs in leg-
islative bodies elected via proportional representation (PR), but 
only 25.7% of those elected using majoritarian electoral systems 
(a difference that is statistically significant at p≤0.05). Similarly, 
we find that there is a small but statistically significant difference 
in the age of the median MP in PR versus majoritarian systems; 
the average MP elected via majoritarian system is aged 52.7, 
whereas the average MP elected via PR is 51.2 years (p≤0.05).
Other possible factors include the age of the country’s population, 
which shapes the pool from which potential candidates are drawn; 
the level of democracy, which affects how “open” the political sys-
tem may be; and level of development, which we measure using the 
Commonwealth Youth Development Index,8 measuring how active 
young people (defined as 15-29) are in civic and political life.9
To test the independent impact of age requirements, we rerun our 
statistical analyses while controlling for these other factors. The re-
sulting regression coefficients, and their confidence intervals, are 
plotted in Figure 6.10 The age of eligibility is statistically significant 
(p≤0.01), and the coefficient is -.73. In substantive terms, the aver-
age impact of reducing the minimum age to stand for office from 
25 to 18 would be to increase the proportion of MPs under 45 by 
over 5 percentage points (see Appendix 1 for full output). These 
findings indicate an immediate effect: lower age requirements posi-
tively affect the representation of the youngest cohort in parliament.
In one final test, we explore the longer-term effects of minimum 
age requirements, by looking at whether age requirements have 
The average impact of reducing the minimum age to 
stand for office from 25 to 18 would be to increase the 
proportion of MPs under 45 by over 5 percentage points.
Figure 3: Global means by age and gender, upper and lower chamber, 
compared with population
Figure 4: Parliamentarian responses to the PARTIREP survey
Figure 5: Share of MPs by age eligibility requirements
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an impact on the presence of young MPs outside those targeted 
specifically by the minimum age requirement. To do this, we look 
at the impact that age requirements on the presence of 31-40 year 
olds in legislative chambers where the eligibility age is 30 or be-
low. This is testing for an indirect effect, as 31-40 year olds are free 
to stand for office. Technically, therefore, the minimum age re-
quirements should not impact the presence of this “young group” 
per the intentions of the policy. Using the same set of variables, 
we find that minimum age requirements have a statistically signif-
icant effect on the presence of younger MPs, even outside of those 
ages specifically and directly barred from office by the age restric-
tion (see Appendix 2 for full output). This provides evidence for a 
downstream effect: lower eligibility positively influences the share 
of MPs in the next youngest cohort.
A theory of mobilizing effects
The statistical analysis indicates that candidate age eligibility re-
quirements have both a short- and long-term impact on the rep-
resentation of young people in parliament. We theorize that lower 
age limits have “mobilizing effects”, shifting the calculations of po-
tential candidates in terms of the age at which they first decide to 
run for office. We draw inspiration from the work of Geissel and 
Hust (2005: 222), who explore how introducing gender quotas 
affects political interest and political ambition among women. Ex-
amining women in local politics in Germany and India, they find 
that many women elected via quotas did not have earlier plans to 
run for public office. Quota adoption changed these calculations, 
creating opportunities for women to enter the political sphere – 
both of their own accord and due to increased recruitment efforts 
by political parties. Once in office, these female politicians gained 
a greater sense of political competence – as well as developed as-
pirations to contest other, higher political offices. The authors de-
scribe this as the “mobilizing capacity” of gender quotas.
We argue that lower age limits may operate in an analogous fash-
ion, perhaps even more so in countries adopting reforms that re-
duce the eligibility age. Like women, youth are under-represented 
in electoral politics, albeit to varying degrees across countries. 
One barrier to youth participation relates to perceived inexpe-
rience, with older politicians in their own parties suggesting that 
they “wait their turn” to run for political office.11 Their opponents 
may also seek to gain electoral advantage, “attempting to equate 
youth with ignorance and inexperience” (Mandel/Kleeman 2004: 
18), according to a 2002 survey in the United States.
Due to their age, young people also often lack name recognition 
to stand as viable candidates. Further, they tend to be located out-
side the networks of more senior politicians needed to come to 
the attention of and be nominated by political parties. Bjarnegård 
(2013: 3) makes a similar observation with regard to women, ar-
guing that male-dominated political networks are a key – if not 
the key – reason women tend to be excluded as candidates in 
Thailand. Finally, like women, many young people simply do not 
have the financial resources required to run a traditional political 
campaign.12 In the case of young people, this is because they of-
ten tend to be at the start of their professional careers – or, more 
broadly, due to high unemployment rates among youth.13
The decision to run for office involves considering the relative 
costs and benefits of launching a political campaign. In a study 
of postgraduate students in law and public policy at two major 
universities in the United States, Shames (2017: 88) finds that the 
vast majority of these students – who are otherwise committed 
to a life in public service, given their choice of field of study – 
perceived that the costs of running far outweighed the benefits. 
Those who tended to see more benefits over costs – and thus were 
least likely to be deterred from running – were those who large-
ly resemble representatives currently in office: white, male, with 
higher incomes, and very politically engaged.
In Shames’s (2017: 5, 15) sample, about 15% of the respond-
ents had considered running for office. A far greater proportion 
(69%), however, appeared “moveable” towards greater considera-
tion of running if the conditions were right. Young people thus 
not only harbour political ambitions, but these aspirations are 
malleable over time. The first point is supported by data from 
a survey of young party members across six European countries, 
which similarly finds that a sizeable minority have long desired 
to become politicians (Bruter/Harrison 2009: 38f.). The second 
point is corroborated by research on young elected officials in 
Norway, who report that the opportunity to hold office had given 
them a taste for political work, such that many planned to run 
again in the future (Winsvold et al. 2017: 307).
Based on these insights, we theorize that lower age limits can have 
an immediate effect in permitting – if not encouraging – younger 
people to contest political office. One month after achieving pres-
idential assent, the NotTooYoungToRun campaign celebrated by 
officially launching its ReadyToRun programme in preparation 
for the 2019 elections in Nigeria. The programme was conceived 
in December 2017, in anticipation of the reform, with the aim 
of preparing young people to begin working on their political 
campaigns – despite, at that time, being too young to stand as 
candidates. A number of young people inspired to come forward 
as candidates, moreover, placed the hashtag #NotTooYoungTo-
Run on their campaign posters.14 These patterns suggest that re-
One barrier to youth participation relates to perceived 
inexperience, with older politicians in their own parties 
suggesting that they “wait their turn” to run for political 
office.
Young people thus not only harbour political ambitions, 
but these aspirations are malleable over time.
Figure 6: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals
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forms lowering the eligibility age may stimulate latent political 
ambition among youth, leading them to begin preparing political 
campaigns at earlier ages than they might have done prior to the 
legislative change.
Recognizing that political careers do not necessarily start at the 
top, we also theorize longer-term, or downstream, effects. Local 
politics provides a useful starting point for a political career, with 
lower barriers to entry. It also affords opportunities to gain polit-
ical experience and make connections necessary for advancing to 
higher levels of office, including parliament. In some countries, 
young voters themselves can open the way: in the 2011 local elec-
tions in Norway, the proportion of local councillors aged 18 to 
25 doubled, largely due to preference votes cast by younger voters 
(Saglie et al. 2015: 268). An early start in politics is often crucial 
for later political success: in the United States, more than half 
of the top political leaders – presidents, representatives, senators, 
and governors – won their first elected office before the age of 35 
(Mandel/Kleeman 2004: 7).
A study of party youth wings in Belgium provides insight into 
the mechanisms producing these downstream effects. The authors 
find that 41% of city councillors had started their political ca-
reers as young party activists. Due to the networks they developed 
at this early stage, they gained a “head start in politics”. Former 
youth members were first nominated as local candidates at 31 and 
won their first mandate at 34. In comparison, those who had not 
been engaged in their party’s youth organization first became can-
didates at 39 and office holders at 42. This eight-year difference 
in the first time being elected, the authors point out, can make 
a significant difference in the ability to be elected eventually to 
parliament or other higher office at a later date, given that op-
portunities to advance in politics are limited by electoral cycles 
(Hooghe et al. 2004: 202).
These immediate and downstream effects, however, are not guar-
anteed. Low eligibility ages for candidacy remove legal barriers 
standing in the way of young people coming forward, thus en-
hancing the potential supply of younger candidates. Yet, unlike 
electoral quotas, they do not necessarily affect the demand for 
these candidates by actually requiring parties to nominate a great-
er share of youth. As a result, the percentage of young MPs in Ni-
geria – which is consistently below the global average for every age 
threshold in both houses of parliament15 – is not likely to translate 
into greater youth representation without supporting measures on 
both the supply and demand sides.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that this aspect 
of the reform is possibly what enabled the Age Reduction Bill to 
pass in the first place. The NotTooYoungToRun campaign was 
keenly aware of the need not to frame the reform in terms of 
“kicking out” or “taking the positions” of older MPs, on whose 
support they relied to pass the constitutional amendment. They 
opted instead to argue that the reform would contribute to a spir-
it of greater inclusion across the political system.16 In addition, 
they specifically sought the “buy-in” of older MPs by making the 
Speaker of Parliament, for example, an ambassador for the bill, 
as well as by emphasizing that support for the reform would “en-
dear” these politicians to the youth population (and thus to their 
potential voters). The campaign also described the bill as a way for 
Nigeria to “set the pace” for Africa, as the first country to reduce 
its eligibility age.17
Conclusions
Promoting the participation of young people in political life is 
becoming a growing priority worldwide. In 2010, the IPU mem-
ber parliaments passed a resolution on Youth Participation in the 
Democratic Process, calling for efforts to increase the participation 
of young people in parliament and other representative bodies. In 
2013, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon created an Envoy on 
Youth to enhance participation by and advocacy for young people 
within and beyond the UN system. In 2014, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) published a report on En-
hancing Youth Political Participation throughout the Electoral Cycle. 
The UNDP Youth Strategy for 2014-2017, in turn, identified the 
strengthening of youth participation in politics and public insti-
tutions as one of its key goals. And in 2015, the UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, 
and security, which urged member states “to consider ways to in-
crease inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all 
levels in local, national, regional, and international institutions 
and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict.”
Academic research on young parliamentarians, almost complete-
ly absent five years ago, is also expanding at a rapid rate. Recent 
contributions develop normative arguments for enhancing youth 
representation (Bidadanure 2014: 1; Trantidis 2016: 149), as well 
as explore the factors leading to the adoption of youth quotas in 
diverse countries (Belschner forthcoming; Pardo Reyes 2015: 63; 
Tremmel et al. 2015: 2). Longitudinal, comparative analyses pro-
vide the first insights into patterns of youth representation over 
time and across countries (Joshi 2018: 1; Stockemer/Sundström 
forthcoming b: 1). New studies also examine the role perceptions of 
young politicians (Winsvold et al. 2017: 297), as well as the ways in 
which gender and age interact to shape opportunities to be elected 
to political office (Stockemer/Sundström forthcoming a: 1).
This paper seeks to contribute to these emerging global debates, 
as well as to add to this growing body of knowledge, by exploring 
the impact of age eligibility requirements on youth representa-
tion. More than 80% of chambers around the world impose a 
“waiting time” between voting and eligibility. In extreme cases, 
this gap is as large as 22 years; on average, it is longer than five 
years. Our analysis shows that lower eligibility requirements not 
only increase the share of young parliamentarians in the youngest 
cohort, but also in the next youngest cohort. As such, we argue, 
reducing age limits has largely untapped potential to expand op-
portunities for young people to stand as political candidates. The 
example of the NotTooYoungToRun campaign in Nigeria also 
Low eligibility ages, […] unlike electoral quotas, do not 
necessarily affect the demand for these candidates by 
actually requiring parties to nominate a greater share of 
youth.
As such, we argue, reducing age limits has largely 
untapped potential to expand opportunities for young 
people to stand as political candidates.
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indicates that campaigns to this end can additionally serve an 
important awareness-raising role on the broader importance of 
youth leadership. At the celebratory conference one month after 
the passage of the bill, Senate President Bukola Saraki observed: 
“The Not Too Young To Run Law reflects the energy possessed by 
our youth, which shows that today not tomorrow belongs to the 
youth” (NotTooYoungToRun 2018b: 2).
Notes
1 See http://www.nottooyoungtorun.org/about.
2 http://yiaga.org/nottooyoungtorun/about-us.
3 Most of these interviews were conducted as part of a consulting 
assignment for the IPU’s 2019 youth representation report, iden-
tifying and exploring barriers to – and strategies for promoting 
– the participation of young people in parliament.
4 See http://www.nottooyoungtorun.org/about.
5 See http://www.nottooyoungtorun.org/facts.
6 See https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/18/national/
politics-diplomacy/ldp-mulls-lowering-minimum-ages-hold-
ing-public-office/#.W1qnGtVKhaQ.
7 See http://www.partirep.eu.
8 See http://thecommonwealth.org/YDI2016.
9 We are not, unfortunately, able to include a measure for incum-
bency rates, which may also affect levels of youth representation, 
due to lack of data availability.
10 A number of variables from the regression model were exclud-
ed from the coefficient plot for purposes of visualization. Full re-
gression output can be found in Appendix 1.
11 Conversations with Kacie Starr Triplett (St. Louis, MO, city 
councilor), 2009-2012.
12 This lack of resources can be exacerbated by childcare costs 
incurred in pursuing a political career.
13 Interviews with Malik Alkassoum (MP, Niger), 8 June 2018; 
Nate Erskine-Smith (MP, Canada), 5 June 2018; Yaumi Mpaweni 
(MP, Malawi), 30 May 2018.
14 Interview with Ibrahim Faruk (YIAGA), 22 June 2018.
15 The global average is 2.1% MPs under 30, 15.2% MPs under 
40, and 27.1% MPs under 45. The corresponding figures for Ni-
geria are 0%, 11.1%, and 25.8% in the lower house and 0%, 0%, 
and 7.3% in the upper house (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018).
16 Interview with Ibrahim Faruk (YIAGA), 22 June 2018.
17 Conversation with Rafael Igbokwe (MP, Nigeria), 22 June 2018.
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